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THE HORIZONS OF JURISDICTION
John H. Fanning*
In March 1977, the National Labor Relations Board celebrated the sym-
bolic casting of the thirty millionth vote in a Board conducted representa-
tion election. As with all milestones, it was a time for reflection. More
than forty years had passed since President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed
the National Labor Relations Act' into law. Enacted at a time when
American labor-management relations were rocked by turbulence, the Act
sought to replace industrial strife with the rule of law.
Through that law, a national policy was initiated to protect the right of
workers to organize or to refrain from organizing, and to promote their
opportunity to bargain collectively with their employer. From the Act's
inception, through its reaffirmation and extension by the Taft-Hartley 2
and the Landrum-Griffm amendments, 3 as well as the 1974 Health Care
amendments, 4 the Board has seen the concepts of majority rule and free
collective bargaining take root in our industrial system. Employers, em-
ployees, and unions have accepted the often difficult process of shared par-
ticipation, through collective bargaining, in the mutual adjustment of
wages, hours, and working conditions. Today, with its central policies vir-
tually unchanged, the Act has contributed to the development of what
President Carter has characterized as "peaceful industrial relations that
[are] the envy of the world.".5
* Chairman of the NLRB since April 1977, member of the NLRB since 1957. A.B.,
Providence College; LL.B. the Catholic University of America School of Law, 1941. Mr.
Fanning is grateful to Mr. Ernest W. DuBester, a lawyer on his staff, for assistance in the
preparation of this article. This article was delivered as a speech to the Fourth Annual
Institute on Current Problems and Issues in Labor Law and Labor Relations on Nov. 10,
1977 in New York. An earlier discussion by Chairman Fanning on the jurisdictional
bounds of the NLRB is contained in 8 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1959).
I. Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151
through 168 (1976).
2. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976)).
3. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (current ver-
sion at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401 through 531 (1976)).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), (14) (1976).
5. Letter from President Carter to then-Chairman of the NLRB, Betty Southard Mur-
phy, Feb. 14, 1977 (on the occasion of the NLRB's 30 millionth vote celebration).
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Having devoted almost one-third of my life to administering the Act-a
period spanning nearly one-half of the life of the Act itself-I am proud of
the contribution our national policy of collective bargaining has made to
the quality of life in the United States. But if the validity of the policies
embodied in the Act, and their demonstrated contribution to the national
welfare are to continue, Board decisions must recognize and reflect the
ever-changing realities of economic and industrial life. It is one aspect of
this problem that I wish to discuss in this article.
The national policy, as set forth in the Act, is that it is desirable that
labor-management disputes be settled by resort to collective bargaining.6
The implementation of this policy requires a mechanism. That mecha-
nism is the Board and it is the Board's responsibility to ensure the full
realization of the rights guaranteed in section 7 of the Act7 and imple-
mented by sections 8 and 9.1 It is also the Board's responsibility to make
its processes available in as unrestrained a fashion as is practically feasible
and legally supportable. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter, has stated that when Congress enacted the National La-
bor Relations Act, it intended to exercise to the fullest extent its power
under the commerce clause of the Constitution.9 The Board's jurisdiction,
therefore, extends broadly to all enterprises that "affect commerce."' 0 Its
jurisdictional horizons, however, must be found not merely in the words of
the statute, but also in the statute's deep-rooted policies, and it is doubtful
whether a restrictive view of the Board's jurisdiction is in furtherance of
the Act's purpose.
For this reason, I am often concerned by Board decisions which leave
substantial segments of our industrial society uncovered by the Act. De-
spite the breadth of its jurisdictional authority, the Board, in its discretion,
may decline to assert jurisdiction if the employer's activities do-not have a
substantial impact on commerce or if asserting jurisdiction would not ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act." Acting within this authority, the Board,
6. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 159 (1976).
9. Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944) (upholding the Board's
assertion of jurisdiction over a fraternal benefit society which operated in 27 states, and
whose business and labor relations affected interstate commerce).
10. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1962) (per curiam) (the total
representative effect of the situation rather than a mere quantitative analysis of the dispute
before the Board is the proper test).
11. The Board was given statutory jurisdiction over labor disputes affecting commerce,
as defined in 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(7), (9) (1976). However, the Board may, at its discretion,
refuse to assert jurisdiction in a particular case when it finds that an employer does not
significantly operate in interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976).
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in 1950, established jurisdictional standards under which it declined to as-
sert jurisdiction over a given business unless the employer's operations sat-
isfied minimum annual dollar inflow or outflow amounts.12 Paul Herzog,
Chairman of the Board at the time, stated that budgetary limitations, as
well as the need to avoid diffusion of the Board's time and energy, justified
the Board's refusal to exercise its full statutory jurisdiction.
13
Two features of those inflow-outflow standards are of interest. First,
they were codifications of existing practice and policies regarding jurisdic-
tion. Second, the standard for assertion over some industries was that ex-
pressed in the Act itself.' 4 Thus, the Board would assert jurisdiction over
industries whose operations were "in commerce," including instrumentali-
ties or channels of commerce such as transportation enterprises, communi-
cations systems, and public utilities.
15
In 1954, however, the Board reexamined its jurisdictional standards and
established new, substantially more restrictive guidelines under which a
greater number of enterprises, previously subject to the Board's processes
and the provisions of the Act, were administratively exempted.' 6 This ac-
tion, as is not unusual in the case of a major change of policy, led to litiga-
tion in the courts. While this litigation did not overturn the principle that
the Board has discretionary authority to decline to exercise jurisdiction, it
did establish two important principles which have had a major impact on
Board actions since that time. The first, established in Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Board, 17 was that the Board's declination of jurisdiction did not
12. The Board would assert jurisdiction over employers with a direct inflow of $500,000
a year, Federal Dairy Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 638 (1950), an indirect inflow valued at $1,000,000 a
year, Dorn's House of Miracles, 91 N.L.R.B. 632 (1950), a direct outflow of $25,000 a year in
interstate commerce, Stanislaus Implement & Hardware Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 618 (1950), or a
combination of inflow and outflow which totaled at least 100% of either the inflow or out-
flow standards, Rutledge Paper Prods., Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 625 (1950).
13. Hearings on S. Res. 248, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1950).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 164 (1976).
15. See Local Transit Lines, 91 N.L.R.B. 623, 624 (1950). See also WBSR, Inc., 91
N.L.R.B. 630, 631 (1950).
16. The 1954 jurisdictional standards were announced in an NLRB press release issued
July 15, 1954. This press release is reprinted in 34 L.R.R.M. 75-78 (1954). See e.g., Breed-
ing Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 493 (1954).
17. 353 U.S. 1 (1957). The Board properly declined to assert jurisdiction over a small
Utah business which had not met the 1954 jurisdictional amount. The Utah State Board of
Labor Relations, pursuant to state law, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-1-1 through 34-1-15 (1953),
asserted jurisdiction over the employer since the NLRB had refused to do so. The Supreme
Court held that the states could not assert jurisdiction over employers which the Board had
refused to cover, finding that Congress had preempted the field in giving jurisdictional dis-
cretion to the Board. The Court noted that this result was required even if it meant that
certain employers and, therefore, employees were not protected by any labor relations legis-
lation, and indicated that a solution to this "no-man's land" problem could be reached by
the Board's revising its jurisdictional requirements so as to include such employers. Id. at
19781
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operate to give jurisdiction to the states. The second, derived from the
Office Employees and Hotel Employees decisions, 18 was that the Board's
discretionary authority to decline jurisdiction over the smaller employers
in an industry did not permit the Board to decline jurisdiction over an
entire industry.
In direct response to these Supreme Court decisions, the Board again
reviewed its jurisdictional standards and substantially lowered the annual
dollar amount of inflow, outflow, or gross revenues which would lead it to
assert jurisdiction. These standards were promulgated in a series of deci-
sions issued in 1958 in which the Board recognized that "its primary func-
tion is to extend the national labor policies embodied in the Act as close to
the legal limits of its jurisdiction established by Congress as its resources
permit."19
Passage of the Landrum-Griffm amendments in 1959 reflected that
Congress had also considered the impact of the Supreme Court decisions.
Recognizing the problems created by a "no-man's land" in which the
Board declined to act and states could not, Congress authorized the states
to assert jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board had prop-
erly declined to assert jurisdiction. At the same time, Congress limited
somewhat the Board's discretionary authority to decline jurisdiction by de-
claring that, "the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any
labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards
prevailing upon August 1, 1959,1120 that is to say, the 1958 standards.
Congress again dealt with jurisdiction in the 1974 Health Care amend-
ments, which extended jurisdiction to enterprises previously exempted by
statute or Board administrative action.2' It would appear that Congress
has had a more expansive view of Board jurisdiction than has the Board.
It is against this perspective, as well as the fact that in 1947 and 1959
Congress substantially expanded the Board's substantive jurisdiction, that
I wish to explore some of the more recent developments in the Board's
11. For a more complete discussion of Guss, see Fanning, The 'Wo-Man's Land" and the
National Labor Relations Board's Jurisdictional Policies, 8 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1959).
18. Office Employees Int'l Union Local 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957); Hotel Em-
ployees Local 255 v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958). In Office Employees, the Court held that
the Board could not deny jurisdiction over labor unions, as a class, when acting as employ-
ers, although the Board retained the power to deny jurisdiction over any particular employer
in the class which failed to meet the jurisdictional amount requirements. 353 U.S. at 318-
20. The Court similarly ruled in Hotel Employees regarding the hotel industry as a class.
19. Siemons Mailing Service, 122 N.L.R.B. 81, 84 (1958). See also Sioux Valley Em-
pire Elec. Ass'n, 122 N.L.R.B. 92 (1958); Raritan Valley Broadcasting Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 90
(1958); Carolina Supplies & Cement Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 88 (1958).
20. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, § 701(a), 73 Stat. 541 (1959)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976)).
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), (14) (1976).
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jurisdiction. That perspective is one which, I believe, demonstrates the
constant congressional intention that the policies of the Act and the
processes of the Board be brought to bear upon as broad an area as is
consistent with the Board's resources.
Perhaps the jurisdictional issue which continues to give the Board the
most difficulty is that arising when a governmental entity,22 exempt under
the Act, decides to contract out some of its functions to the private sec-
tor-the issue thus becoming whether to assert jurisdiction over the nonex-
empt private employer. I have long maintained in these situations that the
critical inquiry is whether the private employer retains sufficient control
over the employment conditions of its employees so that meaningful col-
lective bargaining can take place.
23
Over the last several years, however, my colleagues have often applied
an amorphous "intimate connection" test to these cases.24 To some, inti-
mate connection may hinge on the distinction between whether the partic-
ular function contracted out is required by statute or merely
authorized-the so-called mandatory-permissive distinction. 25 To others,
intimate connection turns on an assessment of the function itself, analyzing
whether it is so essential a governmental function as to require the private
employer to also be exempt from the Act.
26
The only statutory exemptions germane to these issues are those for the
United States, any wholly owned Government corporation, any Federal
22. See note 28 & accompanying text infra.
23. See, e.g., Grey Nuns of the Sacred Heart, 221 N.L.R.B. 1215 n.2 (1975); Rural Fire
Protection Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 584, 587 (1975) (Fanning, dissenting); Current Construction
Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 718, 719 (1974) (Fanning, dissenting). See also Nichols Sanitation,
Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 834, 835 n.6 (1977); We Transport, Inc. & Town Bus Corp., 215 N.L.R.B.
497 (1974); Sis-Q Flying Service, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 195 (1972).
24. My colleagues' application of the intimate connection test usually involves an anal-
ysis to determine if the service performed by the private employer is so closely related to the
function of the government entity as to be considered part of the entity's obligations, and
therefore exempt from coverage just as though it were the entity. If the services performed
by the private employer are not essential to the purpose and function of the exempt govern-
mental entity, jurisdiction may be asserted over the private employer. See Rural Fire Pro-
tection, 216 N.L.R.B. 584 (1975).
For members using this test, the question of degree of control is important only when the
exempt governmental unit retains so great a degree of control as to preclude the assertion of
jurisdiction on that ground alone, thereby avoiding the necessity of applying the intimate
connection test. See Rural Fire Protection, 216 N.L.R.B. 584 (1975).
25. Under this approach, a distinction is made as to whether the governmental entity is
required or merely authorized, at its discretion, to provide the service in question. See
Nichols Sanitation, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 834 (1977) for a discussion of the different ap-
proaches applicable to the mandatory-permissive distinction. Compare Transit Sys., Inc.,
221 N.L.R.B. 299 (1975) with California Inspection Rating Bureau, 231 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 96
L.R.R.M. 1127, 1128 n.3 (Aug. 22, 1977).
26. See note 24, supra.
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Reserve Bank, or any state or political subdivision of a state.27 For an
entity to fall within the statutory exemption provided for a state or its po-
litical subdivision, it must either be created directly by the state or admin-
istered by individuals who are responsible either to public officials, or to
the general public.28 Except in these limited circumstances, when a pri-
vate employer retains the capability of exercising effective control over the
working conditions of its employees, the private sector employees should
not be deprived of the benefits of the Act. Nor should the employer and
governmental body be deprived of the Act's protection.
This "control of labor relations" test commends itself in its simplicity
and predictability. Employers, employees, and unions are entitled to clear
and easily applicable standards that will not only facilitate decisions but
also furnish guidance. Having a better idea of whether they are covered
by the Act, the parties may decide that resort to litigation is not appropri-
ate. Application of the intimate connection standard, on the other hand,
is uncertain and produces little predictability.
Illustrative of the application of both these tests is the recent decision in
California Inspection Rating Bureau.29 In deciding to assert jurisdiction,
the Board found that an insurance rating bureau was not intimately con-
nected with the State of California merely because its creation was man-
dated by the California legislature even though it was the only
organization of its kind performing work that otherwise would have been
performed by the state. 30 The Board has also recently asserted jurisdic-
tion over a corporation providing garbage and trash removal services to
several communities in Florida, again finding no intimate connection with
the state.31 These decisions demonstrate the need for a clear-cut standard
because they reflect that, even when in agreement as to the proper result,
Board members take different roads to get there. Other cases reflect that
occasionally Board members will simply have differing perceptions as to
both tests' proper application. This was evidenced by the series of cases in
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
28. For the Board's standard of analysis, see the Natural Gas Util. Dist., 167 N.L.R.B.
691 (1967), enforcement denied, 427 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1970), afid, 402 U.S. 600 (1971)(as to
applicable standard only).
29. 231 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 96 L.R.R.M. 1127 (Aug. 22, 1977).
30. The Board majority based its decision to assert jurisdiction on an analysis of the
following factors: the nature of the services, their connection with the function of the state,
and the degree of control over labor relations retained by the state. Id. at 1128. I relied
only on the degree of control which the employer possessed over labor relations as the
grounds for asserting jurisdiction. d. n.3.
31. Nichols Sanitation, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 834 (1977). The Board members again
looked to a variety of factors in deciding to assert jurisdiction, but each Board member
found a different factor persuasive. I again relied solely on the labor relations test.
[Vol. 27:679
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which the Board asserted jurisdiction over "Head Start" and day care cen-
ters that are substantially funded by Model Cities-Chicago Committee on
Urban Opportunity, a city agency.
3 2
The greatest number of cases in this area, however, are school bus cases,
in which a private employer contracts with municipal school districts to
provide transportation services. If that employer retains the right to hire,
fire, set wages and hours, and discipline its employees, including those
providing the school bus services, then there is no justification for failing
to assert jurisdiction over that employer's entire operations, including the
school bus operations. In recent decisions, however, a majority of the
Board has distinguished between the employer's school bus operations and
nonschool related operations, choosing to assert jurisdiction only over the
latter.3 3 These cases place form over substance. One negative offshoot is
often the serious fragmentation of the bargaining unit sought, with some
employees covered by the Act while others (those driving school buses) not
covered. Another is the anomalous situation that may result when the
employer's drivers devote considerable time to providing private transpor-
tation as well as transporting public school children. In such cases, the
Board majority, although technically declining to assert jurisdiction over
the employer's school operations, may, practically speaking, end up assert-
ing it over the same employees because of their dual function.
A more serious problem exists when the Board fails to assert jurisdiction
at all because the affected employees and employers are then denied the
protections of the Act.34 The failure to assert jurisdiction may also mean
that experiences under the National Labor Relations Act with disputes of
this type will not be available as a useful model to legislatures which may
be working to establish dispute settlement procedures for public employ-
ees.
A context similar to that of the government-related employer involves
nonprofit, charitable institutions. Over three years ago in the Ming Quong
32. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago, A Corporation Sole, Department of Federal Pro-
grams, 235 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 98 L.R.R.M. 1037 (April 7, 1978); Hun House Ass'n, 235
N.L.R.B. No. 108, 98 L.R.R.M. 1048 (April 7, 1978); The Chase House, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B.
No. 107, 98 L.R.R.M. 1052 (April 7, 1978); Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Metropolitan
Chicago, 235 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 98 L.R.R.M. 1056 (April 7, 1978).
33. National Trans. Serv., Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 96 L.R.R.M. 1102 (Aug. 31,
1977); Columbia Transit Corp., 226 N.L.R.B. 812 (1976) (Fanning, dissenting). These cases
involved bus companies that provided public or private service as well as school bus trans-
portation. The Board asserted jurisdiction over these companies only to the extent of the
public or private service, and declined to assert jurisdiction over that aspect related to public
school transportation, as this was deemed to be intimately related to public education, an
exempt governmental function. See Roesch Lines, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 203 (1976).
34. See Rural Fire Protection Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 584, 588 (1975) (Fanning, dissenting).
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decision, 35 a Board majority declined to exercise jurisdiction over an em-
ployer providing professional treatment to emotionally disturbed children.
In so doing, the Board stated that it was reasserting the practice of declin-
ing jurisdiction over "religious, educational, and eleemosynary employers"
unless the particular type of charitable institution had a massive impact on
interstate commerce. 36 In my dissent in that case, I set forth reasons why
the refusal to apply the Act to nonprofit charitable institutions was wrong
as a matter of general policy.
3 7
With the subsequent enactment of the Health Care amendments, which
deleted the nonprofit hospital exemption, the Ming Quong majority de-
bided that the underpinning of its position was removed. Overruling Ming
Quong in the case of St. Aloysius Home,38 the Board stated that in apply-
ing its discretionary jurisdictional standards, a distinction would no longer
be made between charitable and noncharitable institutions. While this
was a welcome development, its impact on charitable institutions outside
the health care field was considerably diminished by the Board's an-
nouncement that a tentative jurisdictional standard of $250,000 annual
revenues would be applied to most institutions of this type.39 Application
of the $250,000 standard to institutions involved in specialized care of chil-
dren and to day care centers, renders the Board's decision almost aca-
demic;4° a $100,000 standard for day care centers would be economically
more meaningful.
Equally disturbing was the Board's decision to apply the $250,000 stand-
ard to health care clinics and related facilities covered by the Health Care
35. Ming Quong Childrens Center, 210 N.L.R.B. 899 (1974) (Fanning, dissenting).
The Childrens Center was a nonprofit child care facility which the Board found did not
have a substantial impact on interstate commerce. Jurisdiction was, therefore, denied. Cf.
Cornell Univ. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
36. 210 N.L.R.B. at 900.
37. Id. at 902 (Fanning, dissenting). I noted the association that child care facilities
have with the health care industry, over which the Board had asserted jurisdiction, and
argued that it was unwise for the Board to distinguish facilities such as Ming Quong solely
on the grounds of its nonprofit and eleemosynary character.
38. St. Aloysious Home, 224 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1976). Noting that the 1974 Health Care
amendments left no distinction between health care facilities eleemosynary in nature and
those which are not, the Board found that the only basis for deciding whether or not to assert
jurisdiction could be the impact on interstate commerce, and that the same test applied to all
health care facilities, eleemosynary or not. Id. at 1345.
39. Salt & Pepper Nursery School & Kindergarten No. 2, 222 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1976).
The Board established a tentative jurisdictional amount of $250,000 for charitable institu-
tions outside the health care field, while leaving the nursing home amount fixed at $100,000.
The majority did not fully explain the rationale for such a distinction. See id. at 1296.
40. HEW statistics available to the Board in Salt & Pepper indicated that, of 600 repre-
sentative day care centers, less than 2% could meet the $250,000 standard whereas 25% to
35% would meet the $100,000 standard. Id. at 1296 n.2 (Fanning, dissenting).
[Vol. 27:679
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amendments.4 ' It is difficult to see why nursing homes and related facili-
ties with $100,000 gross annual revenues exert a substantial impact on
commerce while other health care institutions do not. By restricting
Board jurisdiction to such a small segment of the health care industry,
little meaningful impact will be felt on the labor relations of that industry
as a whole. This standard may also invite litigation on the issue of
whether or not a particular health care institution is subject to the nursing
home standard, thereby contributing to a poor utilization of Board funds
and energies.
Another health-care related area which has received attention is the
"continuing saga of Cedars-Sinai.'42 In this case, a Board majority found
that a hospital housestaff, consisting of interns, residents, and clinical fel-
lows, were students, not employees, and therefore not entitled to repre-
sentation for purposes of collective bargaining, at least not under the
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. While the Board had
technically asserted jurisdiction over that hospital,4 3 the decision resulted
in exclusion of the housestaff from the Act's coverage.
The Cedars-Sinai decision sparked a great deal of litigation and legisla-
tive reaction. In New York, the Committee of Interns and Residents
sought to have the New York State Labor Relations Board resume the
coverage of housestaff it had exercised prior to passage of the 1974 Health
Care amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently ruled that the
Board had not ceded its jurisdiction to the state and that state power was
ousted.44 There are also bills presently being considered in both houses of
41. East Oakland Community Health Alliance, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1270 (1975).
42. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976) (Fanning, dissenting), injunc-
tion denied sub nom. NLRB v. Committee of Interns & Residents, 426 F. Supp. 438
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 566 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1449 (1978).
43. Finding that these persons are primarily students "and, therefore, not employees"
the Board decided that housestaff were not entitled to coverage under the National Labor
Relations Act and that the organization which sought to represent them in collective bar-
gaining was, therefore, not a "labor organization" as defined in § 2(5) of the statute. In a
lengthy dissent, I characterized the relationship between housestaff and the hospital as a
"classic" employment relationship inasmuch as housestaff perform a service for the hospital,
subject to its control, and are compensated for that service. I also alluded to the legislative
history of § 2(12) of the Act, which defines a "professional employee," and discerned there a
specific legislative intent to include housestaff within the defimition. Finally, I considered
the Board majority's action to be at odds with the legislative intent and purpose of the
Health Care amendments, a view which, subsequently, has received considerable legislative
affirmation. Id at 254-59. See H.R. REP. 95-980, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
44. NLRB v. Committee of Interns & Residents, 566 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'g 426
F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The court found that through the 1974 Health Care amend-
ments, Congress had completely ousted state jurisdiction over all nonprofit health care facil-
19781
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Congress to overrule the effect of Cedars-Sinai.45 Again Congress may be
ahead of the Board in broadening the scope of the Act's jurisdiction.46
Perhaps the most controversial jurisdictional action of the Board in re-
cent months involves the assertion, without dissent, of jurisdiction over
Catholic elementary schools and high schools in Philadelphia, Chicago,
and Los Angeles.47 The process of bringing private educational institu-
tions within the Act's ambit began in 1970 with the Board's decision in
Cornell University,48 in which the Board decided to assert jurisdiction over
those nonprofit educational institutions whose operations have a substan-
tial impact on interstate commerce. While the Board has declined to as-
sert jurisdiction over those schools whose educational objectives were
found to be limited essentially to furthering religious beliefs,49 the paro-
chial school cases reflect the Board's recognition of the considerable secu-
lar function of those schools. It is particularly significant, at least to me,
that these decisions involve only the employment relationships that exist
between the Catholic schools and their lay teachers. None of the cases
involve attempts to organize religious teachers. There are currently more
than 98,000 lay teachers in parochial schools, one third of whom teach in
high schools and two thirds in elementary schools.50 Extension of the
Act's coverage to these teachers, in my judgment, does not constitute a
governmental intrusion into religious conduct. The Act's provisions are
not designed or intended to support or interfere with religious beliefs.
ities. Id. at 815. The housestaff thus receives no statutory protection for labor related
activities, leaving them in a "no-man's land."
45. S. 1884, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), sponsored by Senators Riegle and Cranston
and H.R. 2222, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
46. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra. For a detailed argument against the
Board's position, see Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 254-59 (Fanning, dissenting).
47. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1977). Catholic Bishop of Chi-
cago, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1976) enforcement denied, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978); Cardinal Timothy Manning, Roman Catholic Archbishop of
the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, A Corporation Sole, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976). The Ninth
Circuit is currently reviewing the Los Angeles case on appeal. Docket No. 77-1286 (Filed
January 31, 1977). In each of these decisions, the Board found that the religious schools in
question were not "completely religious" in that they did provide secular education in addi-
tion to religious instruction. The Board noted that its policy is to refuse to assert jurisdic-
tion over institutions which are completely religious, and not merely religiously associated.
See Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975).
48. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). The assertion of the Board's jurisdiction over nonprofit
educational institutions was upheld in NLRB v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550 (1st Cir.
1975).
49. Association of Hebrew Teachers, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1974); Board of Jewish Educ.,
210 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1974).
50. Statistics (1976-77 school year) supplied by the United States Catholic Conference,
1312 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
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They simply reflect the congressional intent to stabilize labor relations by
the creation of a uniform federal labor policy.
51
To date, however, the Board's position has not fared well in the courts. In
Caulfield v. Hirsch,52 a Pennsylvania federal district court permanently en-
joined the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over the Philadelphia Archdio-
cese's elementary schools, finding that the Board's assertion violated both
the exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment. In Catholic
Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB,53 the Seventh Circuit similarly found that the
Board's assertion of jurisdiction over the diocesan high schools violated
the first amendment, and litigation is now pending in the Ninth Circuit in
Archdiocese of Los Angeles.54
Another controversial issue has been the Board's continuing policy of
refusing to assert jurisdiction over the horseracing industry. In a recent
Board advisory opinion concerning a leading national trainer,55 I reaf-
firmed my belief, expressed in earlier dissents, 56 that the Board's refusal to
assert jurisdiction over the horseracing industry is no longer justifiable.
Although the Board determined fifteen years ago to decline jurisdiction
over the industry because of extensive state and local regulation,57 much
has happened since to undercut that rationale. The Board has asserted
jurisdiction over the gambling industry, 58 jai alai,59 private hospitals and
nursing homes, 6° nonprofit colleges and universities,6 ' and even profes-
sional football, 62 basebaU, 63 basketball,64 and soccer 65 despite the fact that
states retain extensive control over some of these industries.
The Board's rules and regulations, which express the Board's policy not
to assert jurisdiction over the horseracing and dogracing industries, are not
51. Cardinal Timothy Manning, Roman Catholic Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Los
Angeles, A Corporation Sole, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1218 (1976).
52. 410 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
53. 224 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1976), enforcement denied, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978).
54. Docket No. 77-1286 (Filed January 31, 1977).
55. Elliott Burch, 230 N.L.R.B. 1161 (1977).
56. Centennial Turf Club, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 698, 699 (1971) (Fanning, dissenting).
57. Walter A. Kelly, 139 N.L.R.B. 744 (1962). The Board also pointed out their belief
that a labor dispute in this industry was unlikely to affect interstate commerce seriously.
58. See El Dorado, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 579 (1965).
59. See Grand Resorts, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 539 (1975); Volusia Jai Alai, Inc., 221
N.L.R.B. 1280 (1975).
60. See Medical Center Hosp., 168 N.L.R.B. 266 (1967).
61. See Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
62. See National Football League Management Council, 203 N.L.R.B. 958 (1973).
63. See American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969).
64. See American Basketball Players Ass'n, 215 N.L.R.B. 280 (1974).
65. The North American Soccer League and Its Constituent Member Clubs, 236
N.L.R.B. No. 181, 98 L.R.R.M. 1445 (June 30, 1978).
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related to the realities of economic life.66 In 1976, for example, over 581
million dollars in thoroughbred horseracing revenues were turned over to
the states. The total pari-mutuel turnover was close to five billion dollars.
The total purse distribution exceeded 237 million dollars, and the total
attendance exceeded forty-three million people.67 It is almost inconceiv-
able, on the basis of these figures alone, that the Board continues to decline
jurisdiction over the horseracing industry.
Nor can justification be found in the assertion that there are relatively
few labor disputes in that industry. Belmont and Aqueduct racetracks in
New York have been hit by labor disputes this year, as have the Maryland
tracks of Bowie and Pimlico. The impact that such disputes can have on
the food, beverage, or transportation industries cannot be overlooked.
Finally, the attempted justification that the industry has only sporadic
employment is of little practical validity today. The trend toward year
round racing in most states, such as New York, New Jersey, and Mary-
land, has produced, even among employees who work directly for the
track, stable work forces-no pun intended-which move from track to
track.68
Recently, there have been two changes in the Board's jurisdictional poli-
cies which I view as constructive. One is the Foley-Hoag 69 decision in
which the Board unanimously expanded its discretionary jurisdiction to
encompass law firms. Through that decision, many law firms are now
covered under the Act as statutory employers.
Foley-Hoag overruled the earlier Bodle-FogeP° decision, in which the
Board had determined that the legal profession's impact on interstate com-
merce is only incidental. Foley-Hoag represents a more realistic view of
the vital role of the legal profession and, in the Supreme Court's words, the
important part that the activities of lawyers play in commercial inter-
course. 71 In decisions subsequent to Foley-Hoag, the Board has also an-
nounced that it will assert jurisdiction over nonprofit legal services
corporations, as well as over law firms, and that it wil apply a $250,000
gross annual revenue standard to both employer classifications. 72 It is as-
66. 29 C.F.R. § 103.3 (1976), enacted Apr. 17, 1973. The reasons behind the regula-
tions include: past history of declination of jurisdiction, the extensive state control over the
industries, the sporadic nature of the industries which encourages part time employment, the
instability of the work force, and the relatively few labor disputes in these industries. See
Elliott Burch, 230 N.L.R.B. 1161, 1162 (1977) (Fanning, concurring).
67. Id. at 1163.
68. Id. at 1162.
69. Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977).
70. Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.B. 512 (1973).
71. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975).
72. Camden Regional Legal Serv., Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 95 L.R.R.M. 1545 (Aug.
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sumed that the assertion of jurisdiction over law firms will not add consid-
erably to the Board's unfair labor practice caseload, and that it will
undoubtedly go a long way toward improving the representation elections
which the Board conducts.
The other welcome development is reflected by two decisions in which
the Board asserted jurisdiction over a foreign corporation operating in the
United States and over an American corporation with foreign government
control. For over ten years, the Board had adhered to a policy of declin-
ing to assert jurisdiction over employers operating within United States
territorial limits when they had a "close relationship" with an "agency" or
"instrumentality" of a foreign government.73
This policy ignored the realities of the modem world in which foreign
state enterprises participate in competitive commercial activities within
this country every day. It was abandoned in the State Bank of India
74
case, in which the Board asserted jurisdiction over the bank's Chicago
branch office. Although the bank was organized under the laws of India
and overall policy was made by its central office overseas, the day-to-day
operations and labor relations decisions were made by local branch of-
ficers in Chicago, and the Bank was authorized to, and did, engage in in-
terstate commerce. In the other case of note, SK Products Corp.,75 the
Board asserted jurisdiction over an American corporation, licensed to do
business in several states, which served as the distribution arm of a Yugo-
slav company alleged to be an integral part of the Yugoslav government.
Again, though overall policy was made overseas, the day-to-day opera-
tions and labor relations decisions were the responsibility of officials at the
various American locations. The decisions in these two cases are in ac-
cord with the generally accepted rules of international law,76 and they rec-
ognize the Board's responsibility to administer the Act on behalf of all
workers in this country.
Another issue related to the Board's assertion of jurisdiction is the
Board's policy of deferring action on cases subject to arbitration agree-
8, 1977); Legal Serv. for N.W. Pennsylvania, 230 N.L.R.B. 688 (1977); Wayne County
Neighborhood Legal Serv., Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1977).
73. See British Rail-Int'l, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. 721 (1967) (employer was merely the
United States representative of an agency of the British government); AGIP, USA, Inc., 196
N.L.R.B. 1144 (1972) (employer was merely the agent of a company wholly owned by the
Italian government). In both cases, the Board refused to assert jurisdiction solely because of
the employer's close ties to a foreign government.
74. 229 N.L.R.B. 838 (1977) (overruling British Rail-Int'l, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. 721 (1967)
and AGIP, USA, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1972)).
75. 230 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977).
76. Id. at 1214 n.17.
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ments under the rule of Collyer Insulation Wire.77 Under this rule, the
Board will refuse to assert jurisdiction over an issue, rather than an em-
ployer, because the parties to a collective bargaining agreement have pro-
vided a mechanism-arbitration-through which to settle their contract
disputes.78 The Board will defer to arbitration when it appears that the
issue in question is subject to the contractual grievance-arbitration proce-
dure and that the procedure will afford both parties a fair and just oppor-
tunity to argue their case. The effect of this policy is to deny the parties
access to the Board for the adjudication of alleged unfair labor practices,
since the Board will order the parties to commence the grievance-arbitra-
tion procedure, even though the Board has a statutory duty, which in my
judgment cannot be abdicated or avoided, to hear and to dispose of unfair
labor practice cases. The Collyer policy provides a dramatic example of
the ease with which the main thrust of the Act can be blunted or diverted
by the Board's failure to keep the basic statutory policies in the forefront of
consciousness.
In a positive vein, the Board's Collyer policy was recently curtailed
somewhat by the GeneralAmerican Transportation Corp. 7 9 case, in which a
Board majority ruled that the Board will no longer defer to arbitration in
cases involving alleged unlawful discharges or other unlawful interference
with employees' rights under the Act. On the same day, however, in Roy
Robinson Chevrolet, ° a different majority stated that the Board will con-
tinue to defer to arbitration in refusal-to-bargain cases.
77. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
78. In a similar context, the Board will defer to the arbitration process when the parties
have already initiated that procedure, Dubo Mfg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963), and will
also defer to the decision of an arbitrator when the parties have completed the arbitration
process, if the parties have litigated the unfair labor practice issue before the arbitrator and
his decision is not repugnant to the policies of the Act. Speilberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B.
1080 (1955).
79. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977). When the issue concerns an individual right enunciated
in the Act, such as the right to engage in protected activity without fear of reprisal, the
contractual grievance procedure should not be allowed to supersede a statutory remedy, for
the individual did not waive his statutory protection by entering into the collective bargain-
ing agreement. With regard to discharge cases, an arbitrator might properly find that an
employee was discharged "for cause" according to the contract, but the crucial issue is
whether an underlying factor for the discharge was the employee's support for, or activities
on behalf of, a union.
80. 228 N.L.R.B. 828, 828-29 (1977). When the dispute concerns a refusal to bargain,
the issue involves the rights of the union, as an organization, and not the rights of an indi-
vidual employee. When there is a question of contract interpretation as to whether or not
the union retains the right to bargain over a specific item, this question should be resolved
through arbitration, as it is possible that the union contractually waived its bargaining rights
over a particular issue. Id.
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Only by extending its processes as close to the legal limits as resources
permit can the Board achieve its full potential as an instrument of public
service. This is a legacy which I would be gratified to leave with the
Board. I believe it is in keeping with the congressional purpose which the
Act embodies, and it is of vital necessity if the agency is to remain a con-
structive force despite the complex and ever changing realities we must
face.

